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ITEM FOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR (INTELLIGENCE) LOG

3 January 1953

SUBJECT: Conference with Air Force Colonel Leghorn re Project [REDACTED]

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Colonel Leghorn stated that CIA's response to specific requirements laid on it during the past few months by Air Force Research and Development had been very well handled, specifically the current target map delivered in November.

Coming to the subject of long-range collaboration between Development and Intelligence, he asserted that Intelligence must be interested in developing even as stand-bys certain technical capabilities for air penetration, peripheral long-range photography, satellites, free balloons, etc., as methods of collecting information; that it should doubtless have similar interest in technical library collation, scanning and selecting devices; and finally that vertical take-off and landing vehicles should be of exceptional use to the clandestine collectors. He therefore proposed direct and continuing liaison with the CIA so that it could express its needs as guidance.

I pointed out that this is what we understood from General Craigie's letter to the DCI, but that I thought he didn't realize the degree to which DCI's coordinating responsibilities had been organized and the need for approaching his problems on an intelligence community-wide basis rather than on a CIA basis. I also pointed out that it would be foolish to duplicate existing machineries in gathering the community's opinion on his proposals. We digressed for a minute on the PDB and he pointed out that it was well nigh useless because of its technical organization into committees of geologists, astronomers, chemists, etc., which prevented it from looking at problems from the point of view of ultimate objectives such as winning the intelligence war.

As to any likely topic for development there appear to be three major factors which can be plotted with reasonable approximation:

- (a) Cost
- (b) Complexity (e.g. number of individual operations and possible ineffectiveness)
- (c) Failure Rate (in an absolute sense leading to political liability)

He proposed that given such estimates it was essential that the NSC be furnished with competent advice as to whether the given project was worthwhile, and I said that this certainly involved furnishing it with intelligence appreciation of the gain to be derived from its use, leaving to State, Defense,

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etc., including PSB to comment on political and security risks. In addition to this service, the intelligence community should act as originating stimulus to such development by formulating its long-range needs and feeding those to the development group.

We wound up on a philosophical digression as to the need for positive NSC action setting policy as between the butcher or obliteration war policy and the surgical or disarming alternative. If the former is adopted, intelligence needs after the balloon goes up are relatively simple, whereas if the latter is the mandate, detailed intelligence requirements will be all-important.

He agreed, after I briefed him on the IAC structure, that the action I proposed of a continuing or standing committee consisting of the Chairman, respectively, of the EIC, SEC, JAETC, Watch Committee, and Clandestine Collection Committee should give him access to the support needed from intelligence. In his opinion the project has materialized far enough so as to testify setting up such a committee for the end of the present administration. There can then be forwarded to it a so-called interim objectives paper which his group has been preparing and the committee can cut its teeth in commenting on that. The only question we did not resolve was what part General Samford should play in proposing this to the IAC. I assured him that we had the highest regard for General Samford and his cooperative attitude and, therefore, wanted to afford him the privilege of presenting this on behalf of the Air Force if he so desired. Leghorn will see Samford early next week and advise me as to whether he will be the proponent or the seconder so to speak.

Final note for your decision is assuming you approve this committee set-up, whom do you designate as Chairman. Quite conceivably the Chairmanship should go to DD/I or when you get one, Assistant DD/I. Excluding those, I think that AD/RR with his combination of economic and geographic responsibilities probably has the plurality of concern, and, therefore, might well be given the action. I assume Reber's shop would provide the necessary mechanical and secretarial assistance.

As a personal note I should like to add that if we are dealing with a six to ten years span prior to a general war, I believe that this problem is absolutely number one and may by the end of the 1950s have assumed a position in the community vacated by that now held by the "country."

ADDENDUM: Later Colonel Leghorn called to report a conversation with General Samford who expressed himself as eager that this program be brought to the attention of the IAC. He preferred that it come on motion of DCI rather than from the Air Force. I undertook to prepare the necessary papers, including a letter from DCI to General Craigie, and to get the matter on the IAC Agenda within the next two weeks. If the IAC acts as I suggest, Leghorn will then lay on a 1-1/2 hour presentation for the members of the committee and then about 1 February present them with his draft report.